Artillery adds dignity
to what would otherwise
be a vulgar brawl.

Excerpt From
"A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 11th MARINES"
by
Second Lieutenant Robert Emmet, USMCR  On 28 February, Headquarters, 11th Marines arrived at Chu Lai from
Okinawa, and, in May, it moved to the city of Da Nang.  The 2d Battalion,
which had previously been in California and Hawaii, landed at Chu Lai. Throughout 1966, the 11th Marines
concentrated its efforts in the vicinity of Da Nang, displacing units to other
areas whenever necessary.  The vast majority of fire missions were harassing
and interdicting fires.  The artillery organization was such that the 1st
Battalion supported the 1st Marines, the 2d Battalion supported the 5th
Marines, the 3d Battalion supported the 7th Marines, and the 4th Battalion was
employed in general support.      In the battery positions, the artillerymen had to defend against numerous
enemy probes.  Battery positions were exposed to sporadic small arms fire and
grenades as the Viet Cong (VC) tested defenses.  As a defense against this
type of activity, the artillerymen set up ambushes and conducted security
patrols nightly.  Security was good, and only a very few times did the VC dare
to hit battery and battalion positions with a company or battalion-size force.
Actually, the main problem for the artillery was incoming mortar rounds.
Countermortar radar was used effectively and often to enable the artillerymen
to react to mortar attacks.      The conflict in Vietnam brought about a vastly increased employment of
helicopters by artillery both for displacement and resupply.  The rugged
terrain of Vietnam, consisting of rice paddies and dense jungles, accounted
for this because it restricted movement of motorized convoys.  The roads were
usually either in very poor repair or interdicted by VC activity.  Motorized
convoys were still used often because helicopters were not always available,
but to fly the cannons over the many obstacles at ground level was greatly
preferred by artillery commanders.  As evidence of the increased use of
helicopters, 3/11 depended entirely on them for displacement and resupply
during Operation SIERRA in January 1967.      Viet Cong activity increased at the start of 1967.  In addition to normal
probes and mortar attacks on artillery positions, 60-100 VC attacked 2/11 in a
five-hour battle on 13 January, and an estimated 300 VC attacked 3/11 and
Batteries K and M on the night of 15 January.  During the latter attack, 1/11
fired almost continuous illumination and high explosive to help repel the
enemy.  These two events gave the artillerymen cause to respect and be
thankful for their basic infantry training.  Constructing strong positions and
defending them with accurate small arms fire, the cannoneers repelled every VC surge.

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462
HMH-462
"Heavy Haulers"

HMH-462 traces its history back to VMF-461, a WW2 fighter squadron, which was deactivated shortly after the war's end.

In 1957, the squadron was reactivated as HMR(M)-462 and equipped with the HR2S. After redesignating as HMH-462, the squadron was re-equipped with the CH-53A, which it operated during its service in Vietnam (1968-69, 1975). HMH-462 currently operates the CH-53E "Super Stallion, and is based at MCAS Miramar, CA, with MAG-16

LINEAGE

1944 - 1945

Activated 15 September 1944 at El Centro, California, as Marine Fighting Squadron 462, and assigned to Marine Base Defense Air Group 43, Marine Fleet Air West Coast.

Relocated during October 1944 to El Toro, California and reassigned to Marine Base Defense Air Group 46.

Deactivated 10 September 1945.

1957 - 1967
Reactivated 1 September 1958 at Santa Ana, California as Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron (Medium) 462 and assigned to Marine Aircraft Group 36, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Redesignated 1 February 1962 as Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462.

Reassigned during August 1965 to Marine Wing Service Group 37.

1968 - 1974

Deployed during August 1968 to Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam, and reassigned to Marine Aircraft Group 36, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Participated in the war in Vietnam, August 1968 - October 1969, operating from
Hue/Phu Bai

Redeployed during October 1969 to Futenma, Okinawa and reassigned to Marine Aircraft Group 15, 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

Reassigned during November 1969 to Marine Aircraft Group 36, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

1970 - 1997
Participated in the Southeast Asia evacuations in support of Marine Aircraft Group 36, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, January - June 1975.

Participated in various training exercises throughout the 1970s.

Relocated to Tustin, California and reassigned to Marine Aircraft Group 16, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.

Participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, August 1990 - April 1991.

Relocated to Miramar, California.

Participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Mar-Apr 2003).

UNIT HONORS

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION STREAMER
IRAQ
Mar-Apr 2003

NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION STREAMER with 1 bronze star
Southeast Asia Evacuations
1975

Southwest Asia
1990 - 1991

MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION STREAMER with 2 bronze stars
Vietnam
1968
1975

1992 - 1994
1996 - 1998

AMERICAN CAMPAIGN STREAMER

WORLD WAR II VICTORY STREAMER

NATIONAL DEFENSE SERVICE STREAMER with 2 bronze stars

VIETNAM SERVICE STREAMER with four bronze stars

SOUTHWEST ASIA SERVICE STREAMER with two bronze stars

VIETNAM CROSS of GALLANTRY with PALM STREAMER

VIETNAM MERITORIOUS UNIT CITATION CIVIL ACTIONS STREAMER

Nicknames: "Heavy Haulers"
ID Code: YF 1958-
Aircraft: FG-1/F4U-1/F3A-1; HR2S (CH-37C); CH-53A/D/E
Squadron Web Page: HMH-462 (Official site)

Marine Light Attack
Helicopter Squadron 369
HMLA-369

"Gunfighters"

In 1972, during Operation Marhuk (MARine HUNter Killer), HMA-369 became the first Marine Corps helicopter squadron to conduct offensive operations against an enemy. The squadron was also the first FMF helicopter squadron to fire the "Zuni" rocket in combat (sorry 169!). The "Gunfighters" were the first Marine squadron on the scene during the Gulf War, and later participated in peacekeeping operations in Somalia. During 2003, HMLA-369 deployed with MAG-39 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lineage

1972 - 1997
H&MS-36 Sub Unit 1 redesignated 1 Apr 1972 as Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 369.

Activated 1 April 1972 at Futenma, Okinawa, as Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 and assigned to Marine Aircraft Group 36, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Deployed during June 1972 - January 1973 in Far Eastern waters with the Seventh Fleet.

Participated in the Southeast Asia evacuations, Vietnam, April 1975.

Relocated during April 1977 to Camp Pendleton, California, and reassigned to Detachment Marine Aircraft Group 16, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.

Reassigned during July - August 1978 to Marine Aircraft Group 39.

Participated in numerous training exercises throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

Participated in the Unit Deployment Program between the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing on Okinawa and the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in the United States during the 1980s.

Redesignated 15 September 1987 as Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369.

Participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Southwest Asia, August 1990 - March 1991.

Participated in Operation Restore Hope, Somalia,
December 1992 - April 1993.

Participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003.

Honors

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION
Iraq
2003

JOINT MERITORIOUS UNIT AWARD STREAMER
Somalia
1992 - 1993

NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION STREAMER with 4 bronze stars
Vietnam
1972 - 1973
1975

Southwest Asia
1990 - 1991

1993

2002-2003

MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION STREAMER
1986 - 1988

NATIONAL DEFENSE SERVICE STREAMER with 2 bronze star

ARMED FORCES EXPEDITIONARY STREAMER with 1 bronze star

VIETNAM SERVICE STREAMER with 1 bronze star

SOUTHWEST ASIA SERVICE STREAMER with 2 bronze stars

Nicknames: "Pistol Petes" (Vietnam); "Marhukers" (Vietnam); "Gunfighters"
ID Code: SM 1972-
Aircraft: AH-1J/W; UH-1N
Squadron Web Pages:
HMLA-369 (Official site)
HMLA369.com

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron-369 [HMLA-369]

Marine Helicopter Attack Squadron-369 was activated on 1 April 1972, at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Okinawa, assigned to Marine Aircraft Group-36, 1st Marine Air Wing, flying the new AH-1J Sea Cobra. At the end of May, HMA-369 received orders to report aboard USS Denver, LPD-9.  When all hands were aboard, Major Hansen the squadron Commanding Officer played "Never Promised You a Rose Garden" over the ships loud speaker and informed the squadron that they were heading to a position off of the North Vietnamese coast near a place called Tiger Island.

The operation would be designated Operation MARHUK (Marine Hunter Killer). The squadron'smission would be to interdict small boats off the North Vietnamese coast that were loaded with supplies from Soviet and Chinese merchant ships in international waters. The mission was later expanded to the destruction of NVA Anti Aircraft emplacements, and truck traffic throughout North Vietnam, at times getting as close as 80 miles south of Hanoi and Haiphong. In addition, the Gunfighters (called Pistol Pete at that time) also provided cover for aircrew that had been shot down over enemy territory until extraction teams arrived on scene. During this operation, the AH-1J Sea Cobra saw its first combat. The Gunfighters had the distinction of being the first squadron to conduct offensive air operations with attack helicopters. As a result of the Gunfighters success in Operation MARHUK, the Marine Corps Aviation Association honored HMA-369 with their HELICOPTER SQUADRON OF THE YEAR AWARD in 1972. HMA-369 was also awarded a Meritorious Unit Commendation for this period. The squadron redeployed to Okinawa in January 1973, but remained active in the conflict through Operation Eagle Pull and Frequent Wind in 1975, flying numerous sorties supporting the evacuation of Saigon.

In April 1977, HMA-369 was disestablished on Okinawa and reestablished at MCALF, Camp Pendleton, CA, as a member of Detachment MAG-16, 3d MAW. Initially in a cadre status, the squadron quickly built to its present size.

1st bn

On 6 May 1965, the 3d Marine Division opened the Marine Compound at the Danang Air Base, Vietnam. The Battalion operated in Vietnam from this time participating in operations from Danang to Phi Bai to Quang Tri/Dong Ha Combat Base. For Meritorious Service in the Republic of Vietnam during the period 1 January – 30 September 1968 the Battalion was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation. The Battalion departed Vietnam in November 1969 and moved to Camp Courtney, Okinawa, where it is presently located.

Note: An edited version of this article appeared on Vietnam magazine’s website, The History Net (www.thehistorynet.com) in December, 1999.

By late January 1968, American intelligence sources detected the presence of 20,000 or more North Vietnamese soldiers in the vicinity of Khe Sanh.¹ American tactics were to allow the enemy to surround the 26th Marine Regiment (Reinforced) at Khe Sanh, to mass their forces, to reveal troop formations and logistic routes, to establish storage and assembly areas, and to prepare siege works. The result would be the most spectacular targets of the Vietnam War for American firepower.²

General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, chose the code name Operation NIAGARA for the coordination of available firepower at Khe Sanh. According to Westmoreland, the name NIAGARA invoked an appropriate image of cascading shells and bombs.³ NIAGARA would be composed of two elements. NIAGARA I was an comprehensive intelligence-gathering effort to pinpoint the available targets, while NIAGARA II was the coordinated shelling and bombing of these targets with all available air and artillery assets.

The efficacy of the firepower available to the Marines at Khe Sanh was a function of the accuracy of the target selection processes. The intelligence section (S-2) of the 26th Marine Regimental headquarters company was tasked with the responsibility of acquiring targets. S-2 had knowledge of the siege strategy employed by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and Con Thien in 1967. These historical lessons were used to predict the behavior of the enemy at Khe Sanh.

Various sources were utilized to develop a view of enemy activity around the Khe Sanh plateau. Sources external to the immediate battlefield included intelligence reports from the Military Assistance Command (MACV) in Saigon, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) headquarters in Da Nang, as well as the headquarters of the 3d Marine Division at Phu Bai.

Intelligence was generated locally via a variety of means. Hundreds of acoustic and seismic sensors were seeded around the combat base. This comprehensive sensor system cost approximately a billion dollars and was credited with reducing the number of Marine deaths sustained during the fighting by fully fifty per cent.⁴ By Marine estimates, forty percent of the raw intelligence obtained at Khe Sanh was provided by the sensor system.⁵ Ground and aerial observers provided visual evidence of enemy activity, as did photo reconnaissance. Crater analyses from incoming rocket, mortar, and artillery rounds were conducted to determine the likely source of the attacks. Shell/flash reports yielded additional targets. Infrared imagery and analysis of intercepted enemy communications were also used.

Marine reconnaissance patrols, Army Special Forces, Central Intelligence Agency personnel, and the MACV Studies and Observation Group (SOG) all provided input to the 26th Marines S-2. The CIA Joint Technical Advisory Detachment and SOG obtained their information from casual encounters from villagers; from regular paid agents, including Rhade and Bru Montagnards, and from locals who desired being hired as agents of the U.S. intelligence community around Khe Sanh.

Likely or confirmed targets were then attacked by the firepower available to the Marines at Khe Sanh. It was the base Fire Support Coordinating Center (FSCC) that was responsible for coordinating the array of supporting arms.

After making the trip down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, the North Vietnamese established various forward logistic bases within a few thousand meters of the combat base. During periods of darkness the Communists dug shallow trenches leading from their supply points toward the U.S. positions. American intelligence noticed this trenching system around February 23, 1968. Once the trenching system had been constructed close to the base, secondary trench lines branched off and paralleled the Marine perimeter. These close-in, secondary trenches were constructed for the purpose of launching ground attacks against the base.

Initial FSCC fire tactics were to saturate infiltration routes into the area around the combat base with artillery fire and air strikes. These fires slowed down NVA trenching efforts, but were unable to halt them completely. From a logistic standpoint, it was impossible to deliver sufficient munitions to saturate the trenching systems with massed artillery fire. Consequently, the FSCC altered its tactics. The NVA were permitted to construct their trench systems close to the base in order to simplify pin-pointing and killing them with supporting arms.

The sensor system quickly proved its worth. During the night of February 3-4, the sensor arrays indicated the presence of up to 2,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in the vicinity of Marine hill outposts northwest of the combat base. Defensive artillery fires were ordered against these troop concentrations. Sensor monitors reported hearing men screaming in panic and the sounds of troops fleeing their assembly areas. The NVA units were completely destroyed in their assembly areas and the intended attack was effectively broken up. This incident is one of the earliest examples in warfare of a ground attack entirely thwarted on the basis of remote sensor data.⁶

By crater analysis, it was possible to confirm locations that were suspected based on other intelligence sources; detect the presence and location of enemy batteries; assist in counterbattery fires; and detect the presence of new types of enemy weapons, new calibers, or new munitions. The direction of flight of a projectile can be determined with reasonable accuracy from its crater, ricochet furrow, or, in the case of dud rounds, soil tunnel.

The particular characteristics of the soil at Khe Sanh often yielded valuable information from crater analysis techniques. A stick placed in the clay soil tunnel made by a dud round would point in the direction of origin, and the angle of the stick indicated the angle of fall. By measuring this angle and using the firing tables of enemy weapons types, counterfire personnel were able to compute the range of the enemy weapon. Inspections of shelled areas were made as soon as possible after the shelling.

Staff Sergeant Bossiz Harris, the acting gunnery sergeant of Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, was known to conduct crater analyses during incoming fire. This allowed the 1st Battalion, 13th Marine Fire Direction Center (FDC) to direct prompt return fire. Rapid and accurate counterbattery fire could force the enemy artillerymen to seek cover from American incoming, thereby curtailing their fire mission, as well as destroying NVA guns and gun crews.

In order to minimize the reaction time of the Marine and Army artillerymen at Khe Sanh, Colonel Lownds periodically entered the regimental FSCC bunker, indicated a spot on the wall map, and directed the senior artillery officer to hit the marked spot. The coordinates were sent to the FDC, computed, and sent to the appropriate gun crew, who adjusted their tubes. This aiming process usually took less than forty seconds before a round was on its way. During the battle, 1st Battalion, 13th Marine guns fired 158,891 mixed artillery rounds in direct support of the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh.⁷

Acquiring data on enemy troop locations was one thing; giving that data a correct interpretation was quite another. On the first day of the 1968 Tet Offensive, intelligence analysts on the MACV staff received a set of infrared imagery photos. This information was interpreted as indicating NVA troop movements away from the combat base. Analysts examining sensor readout data concluded these troops were closing in on the base in preparation for a massive attack. In actuality, no enemy ground attacks were launched around Khe Sanh during this period.

Shortly after the beginning of the Tet Offensive, aerial reconnaissance and communications intelligence indicated the existence of a major target in the Khe Sanh TAOR. Photo analysts spotted a bank of radio antennas at a limestone cave complex in the DMZ northwest of Khe Sanh. Radio signals emanating from this group of caves showed it to be a major enemy headquarters. There was speculation that North Vietnamese Minister of Defense Vo Nguyen Giap himself was personally supervising the battlefield from this location. Repeated B-52 attacks by the U.S. Seventh Air Force were launched against the cave complex. These actions knocked the enemy radio system off the air temporarily and even managed to seal the cave entrance with rocks and other debris. In spite of these attacks, the cave complex headquarters remained in operation for several weeks.⁸

One Marine spotter on Hill 881 South, Lance Corporal Molimao Niuatoa, was gifted with especially sharp vision. Niuatoa was scanning the landscape with a pair of 20-power naval binoculars when he noted the muzzle flash of a NVA artillery piece firing from a distance of 12,000 to 13,000 meters from his position. The location was noted by the spotter. As this gun position was beyond the range of Marine artillery, it could only be taken out with air strikes. An observation aircraft was directed into the general vicinity. This observer did not know the exact location of the gun and so fired a 2.75-inch smoke rocket in the general vicinity of the target. A Marine A-4 Skyhawk jet dropped a 500-pound bomb on the marking rocket. Niuatoa adjusted by noting the location of the billowing bomb smoke in relation to the artillery piece and called in corrections to the spotter aircraft. More smoke rockets were fired and additional strings of bombs were dropped. These corrections and bracketing continued until a Skyhawk on its fourth pass scored a direct hit on the gun position, yielding a series of secondary explosions.⁹

After 1965, air power in South Vietnam was deployed to extend and compliment the effectiveness of field artillery. Although the 26th Marines possessed thirty artillery pieces as well as tanks and recoilless rifles, the fact that the base could only be supplied by air placed limits on the Marines' ability to saturate the Khe Sanh area with artillery-delivered munitions. It was airpower that would elevate the flood of firepower to Niagara-sized dimensions.

Khe Sanh had top-priority claim on all U.S. air assets in Southeast Asia. B-52s, personally directed by General Westmoreland from the Saigon MACV combat operations center, came from Guam, Thailand, and Okinawa. The Marines and U.S. Air Force provided fighter-bomber support from bases within South Vietnam. Naval aviators from Task Force 77 flew sorties from aircraft carriers in the South China Sea. The South Vietnamese Air Force and U.S. Army aviation also provided aerial support. From B-52s, originally designed as high-altitude strategic bombers for the delivery of nuclear weapons, to propeller-driven A-1 Skyraiders, the entire spectrum of American fixed-wing and rotary aircraft were deployed to support the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe Sanh.

Air representatives worked with their artillery counterparts in the Fire Support Coordination Center. Requests for air support were channeled through the Tactical Air Direction Center of the 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW) at Da Nang. If the 1st MAW could not fill a quota, liaison teams from other services were called upon for their support. The priority for air support was so high that at times the sky over Khe Sanh resembled "a giant beehive."¹⁰ Upon arrival, aircraft were normally directed into a holding pattern until a ground controller or ground radar operator was free to direct the strike. Often these patterns extended upward to 35,000 feet with dozens of aircraft gradually corkscrewing their way downward as each flight delivered its ordnance and departed Khe Sanh airspace. A pilot might be directed to a succession of holding points only to end up with his fuel expended and his full load of ordnance still on board. If the pilot ran out of fuel before his turn came to deliver a strike, he was forced to jettison his bombs and return to base.

The contribution of U.S. Navy aviation reflected events in North Vietnam. Clouds that enveloped North Vietnam airspace forced a reduction in the number of Navy sorties there and the released planes and munitions were re-directed against targets around Khe Sanh. In February, about seventy-seven percent of Navy carrier sorties planned against North Vietnam were altered in this manner. One naval aviator who attacked the NVA trench system described the detonation of his 1,000-pound delayed action bomb as resembling the eruption of volcanoes. After collapsing fifty meters of trench, the NVA abandoned the building of assault positions in this area.¹¹

Close air support was employed against pinpoint targets in proximity of friendly troops. Usually there were fighter-bombers overhead at Khe Sanh around the clock. Tactical air controllers in light airplanes or helicopters maintained communications between strike pilots and troops on the ground. The tactical controller made a marking run by firing a smoke rocket or throwing a colored smoke grenade at the target to be attacked. When the strike pilot saw the smoke, dummy passes were made until the controller was satisfied the jets were lined up on the proper target. Bombing runs were executed and short corrections were made via radio until all ordnance was expended. The tactical air controller would then fly over the target to record the effectiveness of the strike. Battle Damage Assessments were relayed to the departing aircraft for intelligence debriefings upon return to base.

Ground-controlled radar bombing was employed in periods when the target could not be acquired due to bad weather. Radar controllers operated from a heavily reinforced bunker which contained fragile computer equipment and the TPQ-10 radar used to guide aircraft to their target. This radar emitted a beam which locked onto the aircraft. Using targeting data acquired from the FSCC, the controller programmed the computer with information on enemy position, ballistic characteristics of the ordnance, wind speed and direction, and other relevant data. At a predetermined release point, the controller instructed the pilot when to release his bombs. In specially-equipped aircraft such as the twin-engine Marine A-6 Intruder, the bombs could be released automatically by the ground controller. Marine controllers routinely directed strikes as close as 500 meters from friendly positions. The Air Force liaison officer felt strikes could be conducted to within fifty meters in case of emergency.¹² Marine air flew 7,078 sorties and delivered 17,015 tons of ordnance in defense of Khe Sanh, while the U.S. Air Force tactical aircraft contributed 9,691 sorties and 14,223 tons of munitions.¹³

The most spectacular display of aerial power at Khe Sanh was provided by the B-52 Stratofortresses. With a payload of 108 500-pound bombs per plane, these Arc Light strikes were conducted against area targets such as troop concentrations, supply areas, and bunker complexes. These targets were programmed into on-board computers and were launched from altitudes above 30,000 feet. Arc Light bombing procedures were based on a grid system, with each block in the NIAGARA area represented by a one by two kilometer box superimposed on a map. Three B-52s, composing one cell, could effectively blanket such a box with high explosives. On average, every ninety minutes one three-plane cell of B-52s would arrive on location around Khe Sanh and be directed to a particular target by a controller. Several flights of B-52s could churn up boxes of terrain several thousand meters long. Many enemy casualties were sustained from concussion alone. In some instances, NVA soldiers were found after an Arc Light strike wandering around in a daze with blood streaming from their noses and mouths. To catch these stunned survivors above ground, artillerymen at Khe Sanh often placed massed artillery fire into the Arc Light target area ten to fifteen minutes after the departure of the heavy bombers.

Arc Light attacks delivered a total of 59,542 tons of munitions from 2,548 sorties during the siege.¹⁴ General Westmoreland was elated at the performance of B-52s, going so far as to maintain that the battle of Khe Sanh was won by the officers and men of the 3d Air Division (B-52). According to Westmoreland, the thing that broke the backs of the NVA at Khe Sanh was "basically the fire of the B-52's."¹⁵

This high praise notwithstanding, Arc Light attacks had some limitations. A North Vietnamese soldier captured in April 1968, told his interrogators that his unit received frequent, timely, and accurate warnings of impending B-52 attacks. These alerts came either by radio or telephone and usually provided two hours' notice, sufficient for the NVA to depart the planned strike area. The NVA prisoner was not certain as to the origin of these warnings. Possibilities include Soviet intelligence-gathering trawlers operating in the Pacific and the interception of communications sent to or from the MACV combat operations center at Tan Son Nhut air base near Saigon.¹⁶

The Target Intelligence Officer at Khe Sanh, Captain Mizra M. Baig, felt that Arc Lights were an accurate weapon which could be employed around Khe Sanh much the same as other supporting arms. However, since requests for B-52 strikes were submitted fifteen hours prior to the drop, Arc Lights could never be as responsive or flexible as tactical air and artillery. Techniques were developed by the FSCC to combine and compliment the strengths of aerial and artillery support. One such technique was the Mini-Arc Light.

When intelligence data indicated the presence of NVA units in a certain region, the FSCC computed a 500 by 1,000 meter box in the center of the suspected assembly area or likely route of movement. Two A-6 Intruders, each armed with twenty-eight 500-pound bombs, were placed on station. Army 175mm guns at the nearby artillery bases at Camp Carroll and the Rockpile initiated the Mini-Arc Light by pouring sixty 150-pound rounds into one half of the block. Thirty seconds later the A-6s unloaded their ordnance in the middle of the block. At the same time, the artillery at Khe Sanh poured an additional two hundred artillery and mortar rounds into the target area. Fire coordination was such that bombs and artillery shells hit at the same instant. When properly saturated with munitions, enemy soldiers caught in the zone "simply ceased to exist."¹⁷

The Mini-Arc Light could be put into effect in about 45 minutes. To reduce reaction time even further, a Micro-Arc Light was executed. The block size was reduced to 500 by 500 meters. Any aircraft on station could be used for bombing. The Micro could be planned and executed within ten minutes. Twelve to sixteen 500-pound bombs, thirty 175mm artillery rounds, and 100 mixed lighter artillery rounds from Khe Sanh batteries could be unloaded on the target block within ten minutes. On an average night, three to four Minis and six to eight Micros were executed in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Combat Base.¹⁸

Because the Marines at Khe Sanh were surrounded by North Vietnamese, the base could neither be supplied nor evacuated by ground operations. Consequently, an effective method of aerial resupply was vital to the continued existence of the base. The principal source for supplies destined for Khe Sanh was Da Nang, a thirty minute flight. C-130s and C-123s provided the bulk of the supplies. Transport crews used speed offloading techniques to minimize the time they spent on the ground at Khe Sanh. When weather or hostile fire prevented transport aircraft from actually landing at the airstrip, parachute and various cargo extraction systems were employed to permit the unloading of cargo without putting the planes' wheels on the ground.

The Marine hill outposts, originally supplied from the base at Khe Sanh at the beginning of the siege, were thereafter served by externally-loaded helicopters flying from the Marine base at Dong Ha. Air Force and Marine crews en route to Khe Sanh flew the last few miles through a wall of enemy anti-aircraft fire - maintenance men at Da Nang noted 242 holes in one C-130 before they gave up counting.¹⁹

As tactical air supported the Marines on the ground, so too did it accompany transport aircraft on their supply missions into the Khe Sanh TAOR. North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns in calibers up to 37mm were dug into the hills around Khe Sanh and menaced the existence of the aerial highway leading to the base. By March, the danger from enemy fire was so acute that all transports were provided with tactical air escorts. Air planners drew on their maps a line indicating the flight path of a cargo plane from the time it dropped below 3,500 feet above ground until it regained that altitude after disgorging its cargo. The potential danger area from which a 37mm gun could hit a plane was calculated. Fighter bombers were directed against known or potential enemy gun positions using 20mm cannon and fragmentation bombs. These attack runs commenced when the cargo planes reached an elevation of 1,500 feet above the ground.

In clear weather, two fighters laid down smoke screens for concealment on both sides of the flight path of the incoming transports. During the siege, every 37mm gun emplacement was repeatedly attacked until intelligence showed the gun to be destroyed or abandoned. More than 300 antiaircraft sites were reportedly destroyed.²⁰ When considered necessary, Air Force F-4 Phantoms equipped with cannon were kept in the area to provide combat air patrols to disincline the North Vietnamese Air Force from intervening in the fighting around Khe Sanh. Carrier-based aircraft bombed airfields in North Vietnam that short range enemy MiGs would have had to use to attack the Marine positions.

General Westmoreland was certain the North Vietnamese intended to overrun the Marine base at Khe Sanh as they had done at Dien Bien Phu. If so, air power was instrumental in denying victory to the Communist forces. Weather and other considerations prevented accurate measurement of the damage sustained by enemy forces from Operation NIAGARA. Photo reconnaissance and direct visual observation credited NIAGARA forces with causing 4,705 secondary explosions, 1,288 enemy killed, 1,061 structures destroyed, 158 damaged, 891 bunkers destroyed, 99 damaged, 253 trucks destroyed, and 52 damaged. Enemy personnel losses were estimates; they could not be confirmed since an actual body count was not possible. Westmoreland's Systems Analysis Office produced four models from which its analysts concluded that total NVA casualties - killed and wounded seriously enough to require evacuation - numbered between 9,800 and 13,000 men. The generally cited figure of 10,000 casualties represents half the number of NVA believed committed to attacking the Khe Sanh Combat Base at the beginning of the fighting there. 10,000 casualties represents fifty-nine percent of the number of enemy killed in all of I Corps during the 1968 Tet Offensive.²¹

The one billion dollars worth of aerial munitions expended by the U.S. during the siege totaled almost 100,000 tons. That amount equaled almost 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily, and represents an expenditure of five tons for every one of the 20,000 NVA soldiers initially estimated to be committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh.²² This expenditure of aerial munitions dwarfs the amount of munitions delivered by artillery, which totals eight shells per enemy soldier believed to have been on the battlefield.

General Giap claimed Khe Sanh was never of particular importance to the North Vietnamese. According to Giap, it was the U.S. that made Khe Sanh important because the Americans had placed their prestige at stake there.²³ In the larger scheme of things, the fighting at Khe Sanh was of little lasting significance. Before the bombs and shells of Operation NIAGARA stopped falling on the Khe Sanh battlefield, U. S. President Johnson ordered severe restrictions on aerial and naval attacks against North Vietnam, declared the readiness of the U.S. to begin peace discussions to end the war, and declined to seek reelection to the presidency. In June 1968, the base at Khe Sanh was abandoned by the Americans. Ultimately, the U.S. would learn that it was unable to win at the conference table what it could not win on the battlefield.

The 11th Marine Regiment is an artillery regiment of the United States Marine Corps based at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California.

A new era opened on March 8, 1965 when the Marines were committed to ground action in South Vietnam. Beginning on August 16, 1965, the regiment was gradually deployed to South Vietnam. The transfer was completed by the arrival of the 2d Battalion on 27 May 1966. The nature of the war required the artillerymen to defend their own positions against numerous enemy probes and brought about a vastly increased employment of artillery by helicopters, both for displacement and resupply.

The regimental history in Vietnam was characterized as fighting by detachments in dispersed areas. Hastings, Hue City, Napoleon-Saline II, Oklahoma Hills, Pipestone Canyon, and Imperial Lake were some of the more significant operations in which the regiment participated. Redeployment to the United States started in October 1970 when the 4th Battalion left for Twentynine Palms, California. The 1st Battalion was the last unit of the regiment to depart for the United States and Camp Pendleton in May 1971.

Marine Infantry

Armor

Reconnaissance

Artillery

Antitank

Other Artillery

Engineer

Radio

Medical

Military Police

Force Service

Motor Transport

Service

Combined Action

Delta's commander, Colonel Charles Beckwith, was intimately involved with the rescue attempt. The Americans faced a daunting task. Tehran is well inside Iran and away from friendly countries. The hostages were not held at an airport as in Israel's earlier Entebbe raid. Good intelligence was hard to come by about forces inside the embassy and in Tehran. And of course, all the planning and training had to be carried out in complete secrecy.

What was ultimately decided on was an audacious plan involving all four services, eight helicopters (USMC RH-53's), 12 planes (four MC-130's, three EC-130's, three AC-130's, and two C-141's), and numerous operators infiltrated into Tehran ahead of the actuall assault. The basic plan was to infiltrate the operators into the country the night before the assault and get them to Tehran, and after the assault, bring them home.

The first night, three MC-130's were to fly to an barren spot in Iran and offload the Delta force men, Combat Controllers, and translators/truck drivers. Three EC-130's following the Combat Talon's would then land and prepare to refuel the Marine RH-53's flying in from the US Carrier Nimitz. Once the helicopters were refuled, they would fly the task force to a spot near the outskirts of Tehran and meet up with agents already in-country who would lead the operators to a safe house to await the assault the next night. The helicopters would fly to another site in-country and hide until called by the Delta operators.

On the second night, the MC-130's and EC-130's would again fly into the country, this time with 100 Rangers, and head for Manzariyeh Airfield. The Rangers were to assault the field and hold it so that the two C-141's could land to ferry the hostages back home. The three AC-130's would be used to provide cover for the rangers at Manzariyeh, support Delta's assault, and to supress any attempts at action by the Iranian Air Force from nearby Mehrabad Airbase. Delta would assault the embassy and free the hostages, then rendevous with the helicopters in a nearby football stadium. They and the hostages would be flown to Manzariyeh Airfield and the waiting C-141's and then flown out of the country. All the aircraft but the eight helicopters would be flown back, the helicopters would be destroyed before leaving.

What actually happened was far different from what was planned.

A month before the assault a CIA Twin Otter had flown into the first landing area, known as Desert One. A USAF Combat Controller had rode around the landing area on a light dirt bike and planted landing lights to help guide the force in. That insertion went well, with no contact, and the pilots reported that their sensors had picked up some radar signals at 3,000 feet but nothing below that.

Despite these findings, the helicopter pilots were told to fly at or below 200 feet to avoid radar. This limitation caused them to run into a haboob, or dust storm, that they could not fly over without breaking the 200 foot limit. Two helicopters lost sight of the task force and landed, out of action. Another had landed earlier when a warning light had come on. Their crew had been picked up but the aircraft that had stopped to retrieve them was now 20 minutes behind the rest of the formation.

Battling dust storms and heavy winds, the RH-53's continued to make their way to Desert One. After recieving word that the EC-130's and fuel had arrived, the two aircraft that had landed earlier started up again and resumed their flight to the rendevous. But then another helicopter had a malfunction and the pilot and Marine commander decided to turn back, halfway to the site. The task force was down to six helicopters, the bare minimum needed to pull off the rescue.

The first group of three helicopters arrived at Desert One an hour late, with the rest appearing 15 minutes later. The rescue attempt was dealt it's final blow when it was learned that one of the aircraft had lost its primary hydralic system and was unsafe to use fully loaded for the assault. Only five aircraft were servicable and six needed, so the mission was aborted.

Things got worse, though, when one of the helicopters moved to another position and drifted into one of the parked EC-130's (in the pilot's defense, it was dark and his rotors kicked up an immense dust cloud, making it difficult to see). Immediately both the C-130 and RH-53 burst into flames, lighting up the dark desert night. The C-130 was evacuated and the order came to blow the aircraft and exfiltrate the country.

However, in the dust and confusion the order never reached the people who would blow the aircraft. There were wounded and dying men to be taken care of and the aircraft had to be moved to avoid having the burning debris start another fire. Because of this failure to destroy the helicopters, top secret plans fell into the hands of the Iranians the next day and the agents waiting in-country to help the Delta operators were almost captured.

The Aftermath: broken aircraft at Desert One.

All told, five Air Force personnel and three Marines lost thier lives and dozens more were injured. The Iranians scattered the hostages around the country afterwards, making any further rescue attempts impossible. They would be released later, after ??? days of imprisonment.

Insufficient information and bad planning played a key role in the failure of the rescue. The planners had calculated that it would take the eight RC-53's four hours and twenty minutes to make the flight; it had taken five hours twenty minutes. The Air Weather Service had not been able to predict the low level dust storms that hampered the mission. If they had, some more low-level bad weather flight training might have made the flight easier and have prevented the fatal crash that killed eight people.

Also, the helicopter crews had been thrown together at the last minute after it was discovered that many of the Marine pilots lacked the skills necessary to complete the mission. It was a combination of Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots who flew the mission. In one case, unfamiliarity with the aircraft caused one pilot to ground the aircraft when it could have flown the mission.